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Female Labor Force Participation and Dowries in Pakistan* 
 
Momoe Makino 
November, 2018 
 
Abstract 
Dowries are prevalent in South Asian countries, despite legal bans. Theoretical studies 
suggest that increasing women’s financial contribution to households is the key to 
effectively abolishing this practice. To empirically examine this proposition, we 
conducted a unique survey in rural Pakistan, and gathered contemporaneous information 
about the expected amount of dowry for unmarried daughters. The estimation results 
show a negative association between female labor force participation and the expected 
amount of dowry, whereas no negative association is observed with other marriage 
expenses. These findings suggest that the negative association derives from appreciation 
of working women rather than their stigmatization.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Dowry, broadly defined as a transfer from the bride’s parents at the time of marriage, is 
prevalent in South Asian countries. It is often considered as a root cause of unequal 
treatment of women, such as sex-selective abortion, female infanticide, and “dowry 
murder.”1 Dowry may be related to “missing women” (e.g., Sen, 1990), a term that refers 
to the unnaturally high male-female ratio in South Asian countries. Pro-gender activists 
and non-governmental organizations initiated anti-dowry movements in the late 1970s. 
The stance against dowry also becomes politically important (Palriwala, 2009). Given its 
alleged negative consequences, dowry is prohibited or restricted by laws in South Asian 
countries.2 However, the legal ban on dowry is ineffective, because the practice remains 
widespread, and its monetary value seems to be inflating.  
Kishwar (1988, 1989) argued that assuring women’s property rights is important 
                                                     
1 “Dowry murder” means the death of a woman caused by her husband and his relatives in 
connection with any demand for dowry. There is an argument that any domestic homicide tends 
to be claimed as “dowry murder” by the victim’s side (who can thereby transfer the burden of 
proof to the accused’s side), and thus, the term “dowry murder” may be misleading (e.g., 
Kishwar, 1989; Narayan,1997; Leslie, 1998; Oldenburg, 2002; Palriwala, 2009).  
2 The Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 and its amendments in India; the Dowry Prohibition Act 
of 1980 and its amendments in Bangladesh; the Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act of 
1976, and the Marriages (Prohibition of Wasteful Expenses) Act of 1997 in Pakistan. 
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to discourage dowry.3 However, it is not clear whether providing women with property 
rights is effective in abolishing the practice. Anderson and Bidner (2015) theoretically 
demonstrated that strengthening women’s formal property rights does increase dowries.4 
Roy (2015) empirically showed that an amendment assuring female siblings’ inheritance 
rights equal to their brothers increased the amount of dowry that they received from their 
parents. According to Anderson and Bidner (2015), the only way to effectively abolish 
dowry is to increase the returns to women’s human capital. Although higher educational 
attainment of women itself may not discourage the dowry practice, the associated income-
earning abilities of women are key to abolishing the practice. This argument is consistent 
with seminal work by Boserup (2007), indicating that in South Asian countries, where 
people often regard women as economically burdensome because they generally do not 
participate in the labor force and depend financially on male household members, the 
bride’s parents compensate the groom’s household by paying dowry. 
There is no consensus on whether income-earning women curb dowry, however, 
and many mixed anecdotes exist. Some report that women’s higher education and greater 
income-generating opportunities have not discouraged dowry in India (e.g., Philips, 2003; 
                                                     
3 This view is consistent with empirical evidence that dowry plays a role in enhancing women’s 
status for those women who do not have equal inheritance rights as their brothers (Makino, 
2017). 
4 Anderson and Bidner (2015) separate dowries into the groom-price portion and the bequest 
portion. The former indicates a transfer to the groom and his family, and the latter indicates a 
transfer to the bride. They argue that assuring women’s property rights increases the groom-
price portion of dowries.  
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Srinivasan & Lee, 2004; Srinivasan, 2005). In Bangladesh, others report anecdotes that 
those who earn income do not need to pay dowry because they are not a financial burden 
on their marital household (Kabeer, 2000, pp. 170–171). To the best of our knowledge, 
there is only one empirical study showing that women’s higher income-earning ability 
decreases the amount of dowry in South Asia (Mbiti, 2008). 
This lack of consensus is partly due to tangled factors affecting the dowry 
amount. There is a consensus that a higher income-earning ability of the groom is 
positively evaluated in the marriage market and increases the dowry amount. This is 
consistent with the price model of dowries (see Becker, 1991), which suggests that the 
one who gains in marital life pays a price at the time of marriage. In contrast, it is arguable 
whether the income-earning ability of a bride is symmetrically evaluated as having a 
higher quality. In South Asian countries, where purdah (the practice of gender segregation 
and the seclusion of women in public) is prevalent, female labor force participation is 
often associated with poverty and is stigmatized (see, for example, Kabeer, 2000; Salway 
et al., 2003; Kabeer & Mahmud, 2004; Kodoth, 2008; Klasen & Pieters, 2015). Female 
labor force participation due to financial necessity may not be seen favorably in the 
marriage market. If so, an income-earning bride may be assessed as having lower or no 
higher quality at best, thus not necessarily discouraging dowry. 
A negative association between female labor force participation and dowry 
amounts can be observed, even though income-earning women are not positively 
evaluated in the marriage market. Because working women are more likely to be observed 
in worse-off families in South Asia, the negative association simply may reflect the 
household’s low relative wealth level (the wealth effect). Alternatively, but not 
exclusively, because arranged positive assortative matching is the norm in South Asian 
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marriages (Banerjee et al., 2013), a lower-quality bride matched with a lower-quality 
groom does not need a high dowry if the quality of grooms, rather than the relatively 
homogeneous quality of brides, determines the dowry amount (Anderson, 2003, 2007). If 
women working outside the home for wages are stigmatized, as is alleged, these women, 
who will be matched to lower-quality grooms, will not have to pay a high dowry. A lower 
dowry for income-earning women is also consistent with the bequest model of dowry, 
which argues that the bride’s parents pay dowry as a pre-mortem bequest by disinheriting 
their daughters (e.g., Tambiah, 1973; Botticini & Siow, 2003). According to the bequest 
model, a worse-off family or a family with many children, especially one with many girls, 
offers a low dowry. Given these various and tangled factors associated with the dowry 
amount, whether or not female labor force participation leads to curbing dowries is an 
open question. The objective of the current study is to empirically answer this question 
by investigating which factors, positive evaluation, assortative matching at lower quality, 
or the wealth effect, is most likely to explain the negative association between female 
labor force participation and dowries.   
This lack of consensus is also partly due to data unavailability and inadequacy.5 
Because dowry is banned in India and Bangladesh, people are usually unwilling to reveal 
the correct amount and the recipients of a dowry to outsiders. Even though dowry is not 
legally prohibited in Pakistan, and people do not hesitate in answering questions about 
dowry, recall errors are very common. It is hard to remember precisely the amount of 
                                                     
5 Empirical studies suggest individual or household-specific determinants of dowry, other than 
women’s income-earning ability (Behrman et al., 1995; Behrman et al., 1999), but clear-cut 
evidence is scarce for the same reason.  
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dowry at the time of marriage, because a dowry usually consists of cash, gold, jewelry, 
furniture, electronics, kitchen items, and others. The current study adds to the limited 
number of empirical studies on the determinants of dowry by overcoming the problem of 
data unavailability and inadequacy. We conducted a unique survey targeting poor 
households in rural Pakistan where dowry is not prohibited, freeing people to answer 
questions about dowries. We asked about both the expected amount of dowry for 
unmarried daughters and the amount of dowry paid earlier at the time of marriage (for 
those already married). By using the expected amount of dowry as a main outcome 
variable, the current study is free from recall errors. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first study gathering contemporaneous information about expected dowries for 
unmarried women still residing with their parents. In obtaining information on 
retrospective amounts, we took careful measures to alleviate recall errors by asking the 
community-based dowry for each household, 6  double-checking its real value, and 
confirming it with informants who actually attended the wedding ceremony. Furthermore, 
our unique survey collected information about other marriage expenses in an effort to 
disentangle factors associated with the dowry amounts, despite the difficulty in finding 
instrumental variables (IVs) to exogenously determine female labor force participation.  
Our empirical analysis shows a negative association between female labor force 
participation and the dowry amount. This negative association is not significantly 
observed with other marriage expenses, such as bride price and ceremony expenses, 
                                                     
6 The community-based dowry is obtained by asking each household the dowry amount paid by 
the community that consists of families sharing the same status and standard of living with the 
respondent household.  
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which counter the negative wealth effect or assortative matching at low quality as critical 
factors that explain the negative association between female labor force participation and 
dowries. Being a female teacher, who are respected in society (e.g., Boserup, 2007), also 
seems to be negatively associated with dowry. Female teachers are likely to be matched 
with higher-quality grooms, but the matching effect is not strong enough to eliminate the 
negative association between female labor force participation and dowries. Positive 
evaluation of an income-earning bride is a stronger determinant of dowry amounts than 
is assortative matching. Thus, female labor force participation seems to discourage dowry 
overall.  
The remainder of this paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 explains the 
estimation strategy to structure the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes our household 
survey and the dataset. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the 
study. 
 
2 Estimation Strategy 
 
Preceding the empirical analysis, we set up our estimation strategy. According to the price 
model, dowry is paid to clear the marriage market (see Becker, 1991). Although various 
theoretical predictions of the model were developed in existing studies (Rao, 1993; 
Anderson, 2003, 2007; Dalmia, 2004; Arunachalam & Logan, 2016), the key feature of 
the model postulates an equilibrium marriage matching, as follows: 
 
𝜔𝐺 = 𝑎𝐵𝜔𝐵 + 𝑎𝜏𝜏 + 𝑎𝑆𝑆,           (1) 
 
9 
 
where 𝜔𝐵 and 𝜔𝐺 are characteristics of the bride and her family, and the groom and 
his family, respectively, 𝜏  is the dowry amount, and 𝑆  is a social, cultural, and 
demographic shifter of matching function. Note that 𝜔𝐵 , 𝜔𝐺 , and 𝑆  are all scalars 
capturing respective characteristics, such as 𝜔𝐵 = 𝐵(𝒘𝑩) , 𝜔𝐺 = 𝐺(𝒘𝑮) , and 𝑆 =
𝐹(𝒔). Suppose that female labor force participation is appreciated in the marriage market. 
In this case, 𝑎𝐵 would be positive with respect to a bride’s working status, and she would 
be matched to a higher-quality groom. In contrast, if female labor force participation were 
despised, as is alleged, she would be matched to a lower-quality groom. 
How does this equilibrium marriage matching interact with the amount of 
dowry? Solving Equation 1 for the dowry amount yields a hedonic function of dowry. 
Posit a linear hedonic function for simplicity as follows: 
 
𝜏 = 𝒘𝑮′𝜶𝑮 − 𝒘𝑩′𝜶𝑩 +  𝒔′𝜶𝑺 .           (2) 
 
The implication of the dowry function is that a groom and his family’s desirable traits 
increase the dowry, whereas a bride and her family’s desirable traits decrease it. The 
question for our purposes is whether a bride’s income-earning ability is positively 
evaluated in the marriage market. Directly estimating the dowry function given by 
Equation 2 without taking the endogeneity of female labor force participation into account, 
we may not be able to answer this question. Assume that a negative association is 
observed between female labor force participation and the dowry amount. We cannot 
immediately conclude that female labor force participation is positively evaluated in the 
marriage market and that working women do not have to pay a higher amount of dowry. 
The negative association between female labor force participation and household wealth 
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is likely observed in South Asia. A family with a working bride may not be able to afford 
to pay a higher dowry. Also, given strong assortative matching in the South Asian 
marriage, an income-earning bride likely will be matched to a groom from a worse-off 
family and thus will not have to pay a higher dowry. Alternatively, if a working bride is 
stigmatized, she will be matched to a lower-quality groom and will not have to pay a 
higher dowry. Likewise, when a positive association is observed between female labor 
force participation and the dowry amount, it may not necessarily indicate that female 
labor force participation is stigmatized. The positive association may simply reflect the 
fact that households with income-earning women have more financial resources. These 
tangled factors associated with female labor force participation and dowry amounts are 
illustrated in Figure 1 and summarized in Table 1. 
Given the absence of persuasive exogenous variables determining female labor 
force participation, we use predicted associations of female labor force participation with 
different marital expenses to answer the question of whether or not female labor force 
participation is appreciated in the marriage market, thereby reducing the dowry amount. 
We eliminate alternative channels in Figure 1 one by one. First, to eliminate channel B 
(the wealth effect), the association between female labor force participation and expected 
ceremony expenses is examined. We assume that if a set of included wealth variables is 
sufficient and no significant association between female labor force participation and 
ceremony expenses is observed, female labor force participation carries no significant 
information about the wealth of a bride’s household and the matching of wealth between 
the bride and groom’s households. Second, the association between female labor force 
participation and the expected bride price is examined to eliminate channel A (assortative 
matching of low quality). Although there is no consensus about whether a bride’s higher 
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quality increases or decreases the dowry amount, the bride’s quality seems to be 
unambiguously and positively related with the bride price (Anderson, 2007; Ashraf et al., 
2015). The positive association suggests that a working bride is appreciated in the 
marriage market, while the negative association suggests the opposite.  
For the sake of completeness, we take other strategies to answer the question. 
First, we control household fixed effects. This strategy contains caveats, however, 
because only limited variation exists in a household, and the non-working status of 
daughters can be temporary, especially for younger ones.  
Second, we use the number of female non-household-member relatives working 
outside for pay as an instrument to determine an unmarried daughter’s labor force 
participation. This strategy also contains caveats because the number of female relatives 
working outside the home may possibly capture some unobserved household 
characteristics. However, since we have no alternative candidate for IVs,7 we report the 
estimation results with this IV in the Appendix. 
 
3 Household Survey 
 
3.1 The estimation equation and the survey’s design 
We conducted the survey in Punjab, Pakistan in 2014–2015, to explore whether income-
                                                     
7 Another, and more exogenous, candidate for an IV may be the average commuting time from 
villages to factories. However, this is subject to the problem of weak instruments because of the 
specific stratified sampling strategy of the survey (see Section 3.2), in which the sampled 
number of households with working daughters is equal across villages.  
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earning women lead to discouraging dowry. The estimation equation, derived from 
Equation 2 that shows the price model of dowries, assumes that a future groom’s quality 
is absorbed by the assortative matching between a bride and groom’s households, on 
average. This assumption is plausible because we explore the association between 
unmarried daughters’ labor force participation and their expected amount of dowry in a 
society where marriage is almost exclusively arranged by parents of both sides. The 
estimation equation is given by: 
 
𝐷𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐿𝑃𝑗𝑘 + 𝑹𝒋𝒌′𝜷𝑹 + 𝑿𝒋𝒌′𝜷𝑿 + 𝑽𝒌′𝜷𝑽 + 𝜀𝑗𝑘        (3) 
 
where 𝐷𝑗𝑘 is the expected amount of dowry, in 2014 Pakistan Rupees (PKR),
8 decided 
by the household head for his unmarried daughter in household 𝑗 in village 𝑘. We use a 
level amount instead of a log amount, because the expected dowry amount is neither left-
censored at zero nor right-skewed, unlike wages (See the Appendix, Figure A1).9 𝐹𝐿𝑃𝑗𝑘 
                                                     
8 All the values are in 2014 prices throughout the text. On average, USD 1 = PKR 109.8 in 
2014. For the expected amount of marriage expenses, the 2014 prices are calculated based on 
the nominal expected amount of marriage expenses, the expected year of marriage for each 
unmarried daughters, and the average CPI over the past 20 years.  
9 The amount of non-dowry expenses are not left-censored at zero, but are right skewed. 
Therefore, we repeat the estimation procedure with a log amount as well as by dropping outliers 
for non-dowry expenses. The estimation results are consistent with those presented in Table 5, 
and are available upon request.  
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takes the value one if a daughter works outside for wages. 𝑹𝒋𝒌  is a vector of the 
daughter’s characteristics, namely, her age, enrollment status, and education level. 𝑿𝒋𝒌 
is a vector of household characteristics, namely, the head’s and his wife’s age, education 
level, and number of living daughters and sons, religion, caste, and wealth of the 
household. A household’s wealth is measured by four variables less related to the current 
decision of a daughter’s labor force participation: the size of agricultural land, the value 
of residential land and homes, the dowry paid by the wife’s natal family, and the wealth 
index.10 𝑽𝒌 is a vector of village characteristics, namely, the measure of village wealth, 
which is measured by the ratio of pucca (solid and permanent) house, and the 
marriageable male to female ratio in the village.11 
                                                     
10 The wealth index is constructed by principal component analysis, allowing for correlations 
across factors. The index variable is the only factor having an eigenvalue greater than one. 
Variables used in constructing the index are shown in the Appendix, Table A1.  
11 The marriageable male-female ratio is the measure of marriage market competitiveness in the 
village, following the literature testing the price and bequest models of dowry (Rao, 1993; 
Arunachalam & Logan, 2016). Taking marriageable ages in the current Pakistani context into 
account, we apply but adjust Rao’s (1993) methodology calculating the sex ratio so that the 
ratio is given by the number of unmarried males aged 20–35 divided by the number of 
unmarried females aged 15–30. It should be noted, however, that the number of cousins may be 
more appropriate to measure marriage market competitiveness. Among wives in our sample, the 
weighted probability of marrying within the same village is 23 percent while that of marrying 
their first cousin is 41 percent. However, the number of cousins does not have any significant 
relationship with the dowry amount, and thus we do not control it in our empirical analysis. 
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The questionnaire is uniquely designed to collect the information necessary for 
estimating Equation 3 and consists of three parts. The first part consists of questions to 
the head of household, including a household roster concerning age, enrollment status, 
working status, and education level of all household members, typical socioeconomic 
questions, and unique questions particular to this survey, such as marriage practice and 
(expected) dowries paid or received at the time of the head of household’s children’s 
marriage. In our sample, the head of the household is exclusively male but for a widowed 
or divorced household or a household with a mentally disabled husband, the head is 
female. The second part contains questions for the wife, including questions about her 
socioeconomic characteristics, natal family, and gender relations, such as decision-
making power, mobility, level of son preference, and time allocation. If the head of the 
household is female, she responds to both the first and second parts. The third part 
contains questions for an unmarried daughter aged 15 to 30. (As described in the next 
section, the population of our survey contains households with at least one unmarried 
daughter in this age group). Questions to her regard working status, attitude toward work, 
wages (if applicable), level of son preference, and time allocation.  
 
3.2 Sampling 
Because Pakistan does not legally prohibit dowry, people have no hesitation answering 
questions about it. Of the four provinces of Pakistan, we selected Punjab, which accounts 
for more than 50 percent of the Pakistani population. The Sindh province also observes 
the practice of dowry but because of the deteriorating law and order situation in Sindh, 
our study focuses on Punjab province. Working opportunities for women, especially in 
factories, are generally limited in Pakistan. We purposely selected the districts of 
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Faisalabad, Hafizabad, Nankana Sahib, and Sialkot (see Figure 2), where women’s 
working opportunities are relatively abundant.  
First, we identified a rural area within commuting distance of export-oriented 
garment factories. Using a district census, we randomly selected 57 villages within a 
commutable, rural area. Second, we profiled all households in each village. Eligible 
households were defined as either landless or with no more than five acres of land and 
with at least one unmarried daughter aged 15–30. Eligible households were classified into 
three strata, based on daughters’ working status: (i) working for pay outside the home as 
a non-teacher; (ii) working as a teacher; and (iii) not working outside the home. If more 
than one such daughter was found within the household, a randomly selected daughter 
became the respondent of the third part of the questionnaire. We explicitly sampled 
households with female teachers, because teaching is the one respectable job for women 
in a purdah-observing rural area (e.g., Boserup, 2007).  
We used the following stratified random sampling methodology. Among eligible 
households, we selected six from strata (i) and (ii) (i.e., households with unmarried female 
workers) and ten from stratum (iii) (i.e., households without unmarried female workers). 
When there were more than five households in stratum (ii) in a village, we randomly 
selected four households from stratum (i) and two from stratum (ii). Otherwise, we 
randomly selected five from stratum (i) and one from stratum (ii). In villages with no 
unmarried female teacher, we randomly selected six households from stratum (i). 
 
3.3 Data 
Panel A of Table 2 presents summary statistics of household characteristics, and Panel B 
presents the characteristics of daughters who responded to the questionnaire. All means 
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are weighted by the inverse of the probability being sampled. Our survey’s population 
consists of households with no more than five acres of land and with at least one 
unmarried daughter aged 15–30. Also, our stratified random sampling methodology 
oversamples households with at least one unmarried female worker. Households with 
female workers in Pakistan are allegedly worse off, and summary statistics of these 
households (columns (3) and (4)) supports the view that the survey oversamples relatively 
worse-off households among the eligible households. For the full sample, the weighted 
share of kammees,12 or functionally lower castes, is 42 percent. The weighted mean of 
agricultural land owned is 1.3 acres, the weighted mean of residential home and land 
value is 670,414 PKR, and the weighted mean of a wife’s dowry is 79,022 PKR. 
Ninety-two percent of households are headed by men. Forty-three percent of 
household heads completed primary education, but 79 percent of wives never enrolled in 
primary school. Based on our survey population, the number of daughters is 1.4 times 
greater than the number of sons. 
The weighted share of working daughters is 31 percent, and the weighted 
probability of being enrolled in school is 27 percent. The weighted mean of the expected 
amount of a dowry is 171,961 PKR. 
                                                     
12 In a traditional rural Punjabi economy, one’s occupation was determined by birth (Eglar, 
1960). Those who provide various services to landowning households (zamindars) have been 
collectively called kammees. Although Islam denies the caste system, and those born in kammee 
households have rarely engaged in traditional services recently, social stratification by birth 
stubbornly exists. For descriptive purposes in the current study, we refer to the zamindar-
kammee distinction as the caste system.  
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Average yearly earnings by unmarried daughters’ occupation are shown in 
Figure 3. Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, earnings of private teachers are far lower 
than those of factory workers. The number of factory workers in our sample is greater 
than any other profession, for a survey area restricted to commuting distances of export-
oriented garment factories. Although public sector workers, including teachers, earn the 
highest among all, our sample includes only two public school teachers. Because securing 
a public sector job is very competitive, the term “unmarried female teacher” usually 
means working in a private school. Hence, average teachers’ wages are lower than those 
of factory workers. For the purpose of our study, it is important to understand the cultural 
context in which a female teacher earns less than a factory worker, although the former 
is respected and the latter is not.  
 
4 Estimation Results 
 
Taking the stratified random sampling into account, the linear equation model is regressed 
using the sample weighted by the inverse of the probability of being included in the 
sample.13  Equation 3 is first estimated without control variables and then gradually 
estimated with them to see how female labor force participation and household wealth 
are related. The estimation results are presented in Table 3. Column (1) shows that when 
a daughter works for pay outside the home, her dowry decreases by PKR 57,690 on 
average. We cannot, though, interpret this as a causal effect. Women’s labor force 
                                                     
13 The estimation results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) and the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) are consistent with the main estimation results and are available upon request.  
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participation, in particular, is negatively associated with low household wealth in South 
Asia (e.g., Pradhan et al., 2015). The coefficient estimates of a daughter working outside 
the home may simply capture the negative wealth effect. Columns (2), (3), and (4) add a 
daughter’s attributes, household characteristics, and village characteristics, respectively. 
As expected, wealthier households offer a higher dowry, as shown by significantly 
positive coefficient estimates of the size of agricultural land, the wealth index, the value 
of residences, and the wife’s own dowry paid at the time of her marriage. Lower-caste 
households pay a smaller dowry. As with the household wealth level, the village wealth 
level is significantly positively associated with the dowry amount. A significantly positive 
sign on the marriageable male-female ratio in the village seems to be counter-intuitive,14 
as a higher ratio, i.e., surplus of grooms, indicates a relatively favorable marriage market 
condition for brides. Given that the village endogamy is not common in rural Punjab, 
Pakistan (see Footnote 11), however, the ratio is not necessarily related with the marriage 
market competitiveness. Possibly, it may reflect the level of village wealth as more 
working opportunities attract male workers into the village, or the level of son preference 
that can be associated with a higher dowry. By controlling household and village wealth 
levels, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient for daughters working outside the home 
decreases from −5.769 to −0.875. Although not significant, the positive association 
between enrollment status, which captures an expected higher education level, and dowry 
amounts possibly suggests that enhancing women’s education, without their working, 
may lead to a higher dowry, reflecting the assortative matching of education. A wife’s 
                                                     
14 It is also contrary to the existing empirical studies (Rao, 1993; Francis, 2011). 
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level of education has a significantly negative association with the dowry amount, which 
may suggest that when mothers are relatively empowered, they tend to decrease their 
daughter’s dowry. When the daughter has a sister, the dowry amount significantly 
decreases, by PKR 4,160 on average, which is consistent with the bequest model.  
Equation 3 is repeatedly estimated by replacing a daughter’s working status with 
her yearly earnings. There is weakly (at the 10 percent level) significant negative 
association between a daughter’s yearly earnings and an expected dowry amount (Table 
4). It may be because association between earnings and dowry amounts are blurred as 
female teachers earn much less than factory workers (see Figure 3), despite being the only 
inarguably respectable occupation in the survey area. The estimation is repeated by 
separating earnings between non-teachers and teachers. The negative association between 
the expected dowry amount and women’s earnings as non-teachers remains weakly 
significant, and the magnitude becomes slightly larger. Although not significant, the 
association between a teacher’s earnings and an expected dowry amount is negative, 
which may suggest that the negative association between female labor force participation 
and dowries is not derived from assortative matching at low quality. 
Equation 3 is repeatedly estimated by assigning other marriage expense 
measures for 𝐷𝑗𝑘  to figure out which mechanism more likely explains the negative 
association between dowries and working brides. Three possible mechanisms 
corresponding those in Figure 1 are: (A) she is despised and matched to a lower-quality 
groom in the marriage market (assortative matching); (B) she is from a worse-off family 
that cannot pay a higher dowry (wealth effect); and (C) she is appreciated in the marriage 
market and does not have to pay a high dowry (appreciation of working women). Other 
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marriage expense measures are the expected amount of bari (customary bride price15) 
paid by the groom’s family at the time of a daughter’s marriage and the expected marriage 
ceremony expenses for both the bride’s and groom’s families. Note that while a dowry 
paid by the bride’s family is the largest expense in a Pakistani marriage, expenses incurred 
by the groom’s families are not negligible (Figure 4). The estimation results are presented 
in Table 5. Female labor force participation as teachers and as non-teachers is separately 
included in the estimation equation, given their different nature, as discussed above. The 
insignificant association of a daughter’s working status with ceremony expenses 
(columns (3) and (4) of Table 5) can be supportive evidence that included wealth 
measures sufficiently control the wealth level of households. The insignificant association 
between a daughter working as a teacher and ceremony expenses can also complement 
the evidence, given that female teachers are more likely to come from a relatively better-
off family that can afford to invest in girls’ higher education. We safely rule out (B), the 
wealth effect, as a mechanism behind the negative association between a dowry and a 
working bride. 
Next, the insignificant association between a daughter’s working status and bride 
price (column (2) of Table 5) hints that negative association is least possible from (A), 
assortative matching, otherwise it should significantly lower her bride price, reflecting 
lower-quality matching. Although insignificant association cannot assertively support the 
view that a working bride is respected, it at least suggests that she is not assertively 
                                                     
15 Both religious and customary bride prices are paid in typical Pakistani marriage. The bride 
price usually indicates a religious portion, called mehr, which nowadays is a mere token 
payment. A more significant portion of the de facto bride price is bari.  
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disrespected in the marriage market, contrary to general belief. Collateral evidence 
indicates that the coefficient estimate of a daughter working as a teacher remains negative 
with respect to dowry (column (1) of Table 5). Given that female teachers are respected 
in society and thus appreciated in the marriage market, they are more likely to be matched 
with higher-quality grooms, leading to a higher dowry. In sum, a negative association is 
more likely generated by (C) appreciation of a bride’s income-earning ability rather than 
by (A) assortative matching at a low quality. 
Our empirical analysis is not intended to show any rigorous causality but rather 
to explore mechanisms behind the negative relationship between daughters’ working 
status or income-earning ability and dowry amounts. In particular, we do not exclude the 
possibility of reverse causality, where parents unwilling to pay a higher dowry tend to let 
their daughters work outside the home. Also, unobserved parental characteristics such as 
gender progressiveness may simultaneously enhance a daughter’s labor force 
participation and also decrease the dowry amount, but it may not be her labor force 
participation that leads to a lower dowry. Even in these cases, the mechanism connecting 
female labor force participation and dowry is positive from the perspective of women’s 
empowerment. However, for the sake of completeness, we estimate the equation with 
household fixed effects. The estimation is feasible because we collected basic information 
(e.g., age, education, and working status) of the daughter-respondent’s sisters aged 15–
30 and their expected marital expenses. The estimated results show insignificant 
association between female labor force participation and dowry (Table 6). This is not 
surprising, given that the number of households with at least two daughters aged 15–30 
totals 428 out of 857. Moreover, the within-family variation with regard to daughters’ 
labor force participation comes only from 213 households. In practice, fathers, who 
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almost always decide their daughters’ labor force participation, do not usually 
differentiate one daughter’s dowry from another based on whether or not they participate 
in the labor force. A currently non-working daughter may start working soon or as soon 
as she becomes her older sister’s age. In this case, the working status of daughters within 
the household simply captures the timing of the survey relative to their ages and does not 
correlate with their expected dowry amounts. This is especially likely for daughters who 
engage now or later in occupations requiring fewer qualifications and skills, e.g., factory 
workers. In fact, the share of households with two or more daughters working in factories 
out of those with at least one daughter working in factories is 22 percent, while the share 
of households with two or more daughters working as a teacher out of those with at least 
one daughter working as a teacher is only 5 percent. This suggests that to be factory 
workers is far easier than to be a teacher controlling for household fixed effects. A 
significantly positive association is observed between daughters’ working status as a 
teacher and her bride price, even within the household.16 Given a consensus about the 
positive relationship between a bride’s quality and her bride price (Anderson, 2007; 
Ashraf et al., 2015), it supports the view that a female teacher is in fact positively 
evaluated in the marriage market.  
Although the number of female relatives working outside the home for pay may 
correlate with unobserved household characteristics, as discussed in Section 2, for the 
sake of completeness, we also repeat the estimation procedure with an IV, namely, the 
number of female non-household-member relatives working outside for pay. The 
                                                     
16 The within-family variation with regard to daughters’ labor force participation as a teacher 
comes from 70 households. 
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estimation results of the linear equation model with an IV are presented in the Appendix, 
Table A2. Female labor force participation significantly decreases expected dowry 
amounts. The magnitude is twice as large as that of a linear equation model without an 
IV. This may be because parents count on their daughter’s income-earning ability as a 
source of future dowry, which gives upward bias to the expected amount. Alternatively, 
parents who decide to let their daughter work outside the home believe that a working 
bride will be matched to a higher-quality groom, which increases the expected dowry 
amount. Female yearly earnings also, although weakly, significantly decrease the 
expected dowry amount.  
Because the population of our survey is defined as households with at least one 
unmarried daughter aged 15–30, the sample may be selectively biased to households that 
do not marry their daughters earlier for some unobserved reasons. In particular, despite 
no rigorous evidence, it is often believed that parents in South Asia can save a dowry by 
marrying their daughters earlier. If this is true, delayed marriage of daughters and dowry 
amounts are likely correlated. Because the average age of Pakistan women at marriage 
was 23 in 2012–2013, according to the United Nations Marriage Data 2015, the main 
estimation is repeated, with the subsample restricted to households with at least one 
unmarried daughter aged 15–23. The estimated coefficient is robust in terms of magnitude, 
and is not substantially different from that presented in Table 3 (see the Appendix, Table 
A3), although the significance level becomes weak, probably due to a decreased sample 
size of 692 households. The insignificant relationship between daughters’ working status 
and non-dowry marriage expenses is also consistent with the results using the full sample.  
According to Boserup (2007), because the perception that women are financially 
burdensome in the marital household lies behind the dowry practice, it is important for 
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women to continue earning income after marriage. We asked the unmarried daughters 
about their intention to continue their jobs after marriage. Out of daughters working 
outside the home, 38 percent say that they are willing to continue their jobs after marriage. 
Then, the estimation procedure is repeated by separating daughters’ working status with 
and without their intention to work after marriage. The estimation results (Appendix, 
Table A4) show that the association with the dowry amount is not significantly different 
between those with and without their intention to work after marriage. However, the 
association between daughters’ yearly earnings and the dowry amount is only significant 
and negative among those who are willing to work after marriage. This is consistent with 
Boserup’s (2007) argument that dowry is paid by the bride’s parents to the groom and his 
parents as the compensation for the bride’s financial dependence.  
One may argue that unmarried daughters’ willingness to work after marriage will 
not affect the dowry amount a la Boserup (2007), if purdah is imposed by their husband. 
However, the majority of women seem to decide whether and to what extent they should 
observe purdah. In this survey, we asked whether the wives (i.e., the daughters’ mothers) 
have to have their husbands’ permission to visit their friend/relatives in and outside of the 
village, the neighborhood shops, and the local health center. We make a variable “purdah 
imposed,” which takes the value one if the wife has to ask her husband’s permission to 
visit any of these places. The share of wives who have to ask their husbands’ permission 
to visit these places is 31 percent. The estimation procedure is repeated by including the 
variable “purdah imposed” and its interaction term with daughters’ working status/yearly 
earnings. The estimation results (Appendix, Table A5) show that the association between 
daughter’ working status/yearly earnings and the dowry amount is only significantly 
negative among those whose mothers do not have to ask her husband’s permission to go 
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out. The negative association significantly disappears when purdah is imposed on 
daughters’ mothers by their fathers. The results suggest that female labor force 
participation alone does not necessarily discourage the dowry practice, and strong gender 
conservativeness of the household may counteract its deterrence.  
Our survey also collected information on the daughter’s brothers’ paid (if he is 
married) or expected (if he is not married) dowry amount. And thus, we can check 
whether there is any association between the daughter’s working status and the daughter’s 
brothers’ average amount of marriage expenses. The estimation results (Appendix, Table 
A6) show that there is no significant association between the daughter’s working status 
and her brothers’ average marriage expenses. The results suggest that, although 
households with working daughters may be relatively gender progressive, it is not 
households’ gender progressiveness alone that leads to a lower amount of dowry. Besides, 
the positive association, although insignificant, between the daughter’s working status 
and her brothers’ bride price and ceremony expenses may support the argument that the 
wealth level and financial capacity of the households are sufficiently controlled by 
included covariates, even though working daughters are, on average, from worse-off 
households.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The empirical analysis in this study consistently shows a negative association between 
female labor force participation and dowry. It supports the view that this association 
relates to an appreciation of women’s income-earning ability rather than to assortative 
matching at low quality or negative wealth effects. It is also consistent with Anderson and 
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Bidner’s (2015) recent theoretical model, showing that enhancing returns to education is 
the key to curbing dowries. Educated brides without working opportunities do not seem 
to be evaluated positively in the marriage market and this does not decrease the dowry 
amount. In the long run, however, enhancing female education itself may be effective in 
discouraging the dowry practice, because we found a negative association between more 
educated mothers and their daughters’ expected dowry. This may be because they are 
more empowered and enjoy a higher bargaining position within a household.  
Our estimation results are also consistent with anecdotes about female sewing 
operators hired by the garment industry in Bangladesh, which report that they do not need 
to pay dowry at the time of marriage (e.g., Kabeer, 2000). In Bangladesh, this relatively 
new industry provides opportunities for women in poor rural families by paying them 
relatively higher wages compared with alternatives such as housekeeping and agricultural 
labor. The phenomenon is very similar in Pakistani villages within commuting distance 
of this industry. Although female sewing operators in Pakistan are less common than in 
Bangladesh, this is undoubtedly a new income-earning opportunity that pays higher 
wages than other existing alternatives, including teaching in private schools. According 
to Makino (2014), these women earn as much as men, who are typically employed as 
construction workers, drivers, and factory workers. These women are surely not 
financially burdensome, and following Boserup’s (2007) logic, they do not need to pay 
dowries. Anecdotally, it is said that working women in factories are dishonored and that 
a strong stigma is attached to their working outside the home. However, our qualitative 
interviews reveal that working women have a positive outlook about working outside the 
home for pay. The majority think that working outside the home helps them find a good 
match in marriage. This may indicate the possibility that women working in factories are 
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nowadays less stigmatized, which is pointed out by Klasen and Pieters (2015). 
If a policy objective is to abolish dowries, generating new, income-earning 
opportunities for women in poor households, such as those in the garment industry, seems 
more effective than a legal ban on dowries. However, such opportunities alone are not 
necessarily promising in the effort to extinguish dowries. As the association between 
brides’ earnings and the expected dowry amount is only significant among those who are 
willing to work after marriage, the financial independence of women before and after 
marriage may be the key to abolishing dowry. Further investigation of factors behind 
persistent dowry practice in contemporary South Asia is clearly called for.
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Table 1. Theoretical prediction about the relationship between female labor force participation and marital expenses (+ positive, - 
negative) 
  Mechanism Condition Dowry  
Bari 
(customary 
bride price) 
Bride's side 
ceremony 
expense  
Groom's side 
ceremony 
expense  
(A) 
Assortative 
matching 
Working women are stigmatized. - - (-) (-) 
Working women are appreciated. + + (+) (+) 
(B) 
Wealth 
effect 
Working women are from worse-off families. - - - - 
Working women financially contribute to 
their families. 
+ + + + 
(C) 
Price 
model: 
marriage 
market 
clearing 
Working women are stigmatized. + - (no prediction) (no prediction) 
Working women are appreciated. - + (no prediction) (no prediction) 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of household and unmarred daughters, aged 15-30 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 N = 856 
Households with working daughter 
(N = 327) 
  Weighted mean Standard deviation  Weighted mean Standard deviation  
Panel A: Household characteristics     
Head's age 50.85 6.37 51.87 6.08 
Head's gender 0.92 0.27 0.88 0.33 
Head's education 2.41 1.68 1.92 1.45 
Wife's age 46.33 5.85 47.77 5.98 
Wife's education 1.60 1.18 1.30 0.78 
Kammee (= lower caste) 0.42 0.49 0.71 0.45 
Acres of agricultural land 1.34 1.60 0.39 0.98 
Value of residential home and land (2014 PKR) 670,414 277,133 596,020 254,510 
Wife's dowry (2014 PKR) 79,022 48,464 57,923 45,285 
Number of living daughters 2.95 1.47 3.28 1.52 
Number of living sons 2.14 1.20 2.02 1.23 
Muslim 0.95 0.22 0.87 0.34 
Number of female relatives working outside the 
home 
0.37 0.71 0.85 0.92 
    
Panel B: Characteristics of unmarried daughter-respondents, aged 15-30  
Age 20.35 3.06 21.51 2.74 
Enrollment status 0.27 0.44 0.01 0.07 
  Education (not enrolled only: N = 655) 3.58 1.66 3.45 1.82 
Working status (work outside the home for pay) 0.31 0.46   
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  Working as a teacher 0.02 0.14   
Expected dowry (2014 PKR) 171,961 71,077 134,260 54,622 
Expected bride price (2014 PKR) 85,613 61,772 58,189 46,100 
Expected ceremony expenses (2014 PKR) 90,767 56,789 65,235 38,084 
Expected ceremony expenses by in-laws 
(2014PKR) 
118,622 67,674 86,755 40,824 
The sample is weighted by the inverse of the probability being sampled. Education is a categorical variable: 1= No education; 2= Below 
primary (less than 5 yrs.); 3= Primary completed (5 yrs.); 4= Middle completed (8 yrs.); 5= Matric completed (10 yrs.): 6= Intermediate 
completed (12yrs.); 7= Graduate or Post-graduate degree 
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Table 3. Association between unmarried daughters' labor force participation and 
expected dowry amount (2014 PKR10,000) 
LHS: Expected dowry amount (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Daughter: Work outside -5.769*** -4.811*** -0.804* -0.875** 
 (0.773) (0.758) (0.425) (0.417) 
Daughter: Age  0.408*** 0.0142 0.0382 
  (0.151) (0.0837) (0.0769) 
Daughter: Enrollment status  5.824*** 1.225 0.816 
  (1.085) (0.771) (0.792) 
Daughter: Education  0.407** 0.0483 -0.0384 
  (0.159) (0.122) (0.126) 
Number of living daughters   -0.387*** -0.416*** 
   (0.124) (0.121) 
Number of living sons   0.0321 -0.0097 
   (0.160) (0.162) 
Head's age   -0.0414 -0.0648 
 
  (0.0512) (0.0482) 
Head's gender   0.973 1.284* 
 
  (0.804) (0.767) 
Head's education   0.211 0.147 
 
  (0.135) (0.131) 
Wife's age   0.0871 0.108* 
 
  (0.0630) (0.0623) 
Wife's education   -0.538*** -0.535*** 
 
  (0.191) (0.188) 
Muslim   -0.454 -0.231 
 
  (0.918) (0.902) 
Kammee (= lower caste)   -2.393*** -2.435*** 
 
  (0.521) (0.518) 
Acres of agricultural land   1.744*** 1.746*** 
 
  (0.251) (0.253) 
Wealth index   1.258*** 1.122*** 
 
  (0.289) (0.276) 
Value of residential home and 
land 
  0.0187*** 0.0191*** 
  (0.0063) (0.0058) 
Wife's dowry   0.335*** 0.337*** 
   (0.118) (0.122) 
Village: Marriageable male to 
female ratio  
   4.401*** 
   (1.593) 
Village: Pucca household ratio    4.237*** 
    (1.460) 
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Constant 18.35*** 6.977** 8.938*** 0.218 
 (0.830) (3.151) (2.651) (3.768) 
     
Observations 856 856 856 856 
R-squared 0.137 0.201 0.595 0.611 
Linearized standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The 
survey year is controlled. 
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Table 4. Association between unmarried daughters' yearly earnings and expected 
dowry amount (2014 PKR 10,000) 
LHS: Expected dowry amount (1) (2) 
    
Daughter: Yearly earnings -0.0682*  
 (0.0397)  
Daughter: Non-teacher yearly earnings   -0.0706* 
 
 (0.0372) 
Daughter: Teacher yearly earnings   -0.0750 
 
 (0.147) 
 
 
 
Observations 856 856 
R-squared 0.610 0.610 
Linearized standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
Included control variables (daughter's attributes, household and village 
characteristics, and year fixed effects) are the same as in the estimation reported in 
column (4) of Table 3. 
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Table 5. Association between unmarried daughters' labor force participation and 
expected marriage expenses (2014 PKR 10,000) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Dowry Bride price  
Bride-side 
ceremony 
expense  
Groom-side 
ceremony 
expense  
          
Daughter: Work outside 
the home (non-teacher) 
-1.067** -0.107 -0.0849 -0.135 
(0.450) (0.491) (0.440) (0.511) 
Daughter: Teacher -1.476 -0.134 0.336 0.110 
 (1.128) (1.068) (0.875) (1.133) 
     
Observations 856 856 856 856 
R-squared 0.612 0.458 0.427 0.499 
Linearized standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
Included control variables (daughter's attributes, household and village characteristics, 
and year fixed effects) are the same as in the estimation reported in column (4) of 
Table 3. 
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Table 6. Association between female labor force participation and dowry/bride price, 
with household fixed effects (2014 PKR 10,000) 
 (1) (2) 
  Dowry  Bride price  
    
Daughter: Work outside the home 
(non-teacher) 
0.143 0.734 
(0.176) (0.570) 
Daughter: Teacher 0.426 0.644** 
 (0.288) (0.316) 
Daughter: Age -0.0159 -0.0774 
 (0.0288) (0.0592) 
Daughter: Enrollment status -0.285 0.519 
 (0.336) (0.568) 
Daughter: Education -0.122** -0.00239 
 (0.0557) (0.0577) 
Constant 17.62*** 8.975*** 
 (0.629) (1.181) 
   
Observations 1,424 1,424 
R-squared 0.011 0.016 
Number of households 857 857 
Clustered (household level) standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1).   
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Figure 1. Tangled factors associating female labor force participation and 
dowries 
The objective of the estimation strategy is to extract the channel C and its sign. 
Negative relationships between female labor force participation and dowries are 
consistent with A (= assortative matching at low quality) if working women are 
stigmatized, B (= negative wealth effect), and C (= appreciation of working women). 
Likewise, positive relationships are consistent with A (= assortative matching at high 
quality) if working women are appreciated, B (= positive wealth effect), and C (= 
stigmatized working women).  
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Figure 2. Locations of household surveys conducted by the author in 2014–2015 
The survey districts, i..e, Hafizabad, Faisalabad, Nankana Sahib, and Sialkot, 
are purposely selected so that women’s working opportunities are relatively abundant. 
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Figure 3. Average yearly earnings by unmarried daughter’s occupation (2014 PKR) 
The number of observations in each occupation category is in parentheses, 
which in total exceeds the number of households with working daughters as some 
households include two or more working daughters. Other occupations include 
agricultural labor, housekeeper, brick maker, traditional service, and so on. Note that the 
households with at least one unmarried daughter being a teacher are oversampled. This 
explains the low share of daughter-teacher households in Table 2, which shows the 
weighted means by the inverse of the probability being sampled, while the sample 
includes 76 teachers (74 private and 2 public school teachers). 
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Figure 4. Average expected marriage expenses (2014 PKR) 
The values are calculated in 2014 prices (USD 1= PKR 109.8), based on the 
nominal expected amount of marriage expenses, the expected marriage year for each 
unmarried daughters, and the average CPI over the past 20 years. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A1. Ownership of goods that comprise the household wealth index (N = 857) 
  (1) (2) 
  Mean Standard deviation 
Bicycle 0.443 0.497 
Motorbike 0.525 0.500 
Car 0.006 0.076 
Washing  machine 0.530 0.499 
Sewing machine 0.866 0.341 
Generator 0.079 0.270 
TV 0.847 0.360 
Fan 0.996 0.059 
AC 0.007 0.083 
Cellphone 0.996 0.059 
Fridge 0.425 0.495 
The wealth index is constructed by principal component analysis, allowing for 
correlations across factors. The index variable is the only factor having an eigenvalue 
greater than one.  
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Table A2. Association between unmarried daughters' working status/yearly earnings and the expected dowry amount (linear 
equation model with IVs, 2014 PKR 10,000) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: First stage 
Daughter: 
work outside Daughter: yearly 
earnings 
Daughter: work 
outside (non-
teacher) 
Daughter: non-
teacher yearly 
earnings 
Number of female relatives working outside 
the home for pay 
0.219*** 1.863*** 0.208*** 1.803*** 
(0.0284) (0.291) (0.0269) (0.290) 
Panel B: Second stage LHS: Expected dowry  
    
 
Daughter: Work outside the home  -2.087**  -2.200**  
 (0.892)  (0.932)  
Daughter: Yearly earnings  -0.246**  -0.254** 
  (0.105)  (0.109) 
    
 
Observations 856 856 856 856 
Linearized standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Excluded variable is the number of female 
relatives working outside for pay. Other included control variables (daughter's attributes, household and village characteristics, 
and year fixed effects) are the same as in the estimation reported in column (4) of Table 3. 
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Table A3. Association between unmarried daughters' (aged 15-23) working status and 
the expected marital expenses (linear equation model, 2014 PKR 10,000) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dowry 
Bride 
price  
Bride-side 
ceremony 
expense  
Groom-side 
ceremony 
expense  
   
  
Daughter: Work outside the home  -0.755* 0.0631 0.135 0.0786 
 (0.434) (0.536) (0.473) (0.566) 
   
  
Observations 692 692 692 692 
R-squared 0.629 0.444 0.425 0.510 
Linearized standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
Included control variables (daughter's attributes, household and village characteristics, 
and year fixed effects) are the same as in the estimation reported in column (4) of 
Table 3. 
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Table A4. Difference in association between unmarried daughters' working status and 
expected dowry amount by willingness to work after marriage (2014 PKR 10,000) 
LHS: Expected dowry amount (1) (2) 
    
Daughter: Work outside× willing to work after marriage -0.937*  
 (0.537)  
Daughter: Work outside× not willing to work after marriage -0.844*  
 (0.434)  
Daughter: Yearly earnings× willing to work after marriage  -0.0807* 
 
 (0.0481) 
Daughter: Yearly earnings× not willing to work after marriage  -0.0602 
 
 (0.0418) 
 
 
 
Observations 856 856 
R-squared 0.611 0.610 
Linearized standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). The 
indicator variable willing to work after marriage takes the value one when the 
daughter is willing to work after marriage. Included control variables (daughter's 
attributes, household and village characteristics, and year fixed effects) are the same 
as in the estimation reported in column (4) of Table 3. 
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Table A5. Difference in association between unmarried daughters' working status 
and expected dowry amount by whether purdah is imposed on their mothers by 
their fathers (2014 PKR 10,000) 
LHS: Expected dowry amount (1) (2) 
    
Daughter: Work outside the home -1.327**  
 (0.511)  
Daughter: Yearly earnings  -0.101** 
 
 (0.0449) 
Purdah imposed -0.769 -0.677 
 (0.576) (0.536) 
Daughter: Work outside× purdah imposed 1.396*  
 (0.742) 
 
Daughter: Yearly earnings× purdah imposed  0.103* 
 
 (0.0596) 
 
 
 
Observations 856 856 
R-squared 0.613 0.612 
Linearized standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
The indicator variable purdah imposed takes the value one when the daughter’s 
mother has to ask permission from her father to go outside. Included control 
variables (daughter's attributes, household and village characteristics, and year 
fixed effects) are the same as in the estimation reported in column (4) of Table 3. 
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Table A6. Association between unmarried daughters' working status and the average 
marital expenses for their brothers (linear equation model, 2014 PKR 10,000) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Brothers' 
average dowry 
by their in-laws 
Brothers' 
average bride 
price  
Own parents' 
average 
ceremony 
expense  
Brothers' in-
laws' average 
ceremony 
expense  
   
  
Daughter: Work 
outside the home 
-0.283 0.0067 0.173 0.357 
(0.525) (0.322) (0.456) (0.393) 
   
  
Observations 788 788 788 788 
R-squared 0.551 0.524 0.450 0.473 
Linearized standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
Included control variables (daughter's attributes, household and village characteristics, 
and year fixed effects) are the same as in the estimation reported in column (4) of 
Table 3. 
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Figure A1. Distribution of Expected Marital Expenses in 2014 PKR 
 
